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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses theoretical and practical issues related to long-term care (LTC) services in 
Latin America. Demand for these services will rise as the region undergoes a swift demographic 
transition from its currently young population to a rapidly aging one, especially since the region’s 
aging cohorts are more prone to experience a decline in their functional and physical abilities than 
elderly people elsewhere in the world. We argue that private insurance markets are ill-equipped to 
provide coverage to meet the need for LTC, while the amount of personal savings required to 
afford self-insurance would be prohibitively high. In Latin America LTC may not be an 
immediate priority, but governments are likely to encourage the development of LTC programs 
as demand for them steadily grows. In particular, policymakers are probably going to focus 
initially on LTC programs for the poor and vulnerable, for whom affordability of LTC is a greater 
problem. We therefore study how basic elements of policy design affect cost-effectiveness of 
LTC programs by means of a formal model. In a simple context where families can provide care 
themselves or hire care in a market, we find that pro-poor programs are more cost effective when 
families have the option to receive cash subsidies, as the opportunity cost of providing care is 
lower for poor families. Moreover, the availability of in-kind and in-cash choices reduces 
program costs overall by screening families based on their opportunity cost of providing care.
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1. Introduction  
Worldwide, the process of population aging has increased the need for long-term care 
(LTC) services to assist the elderly. According to the US Department of Health and 
Human Services, “long-term care is a range of services and supports you may need to 
meet your personal care needs. Most long-term care is not medical care, but rather 
assistance with the basic personal tasks of everyday life, sometimes called Activities of 
Daily Living (ADLs).” Most LTC-related activities do not require care providers to have 
acquired highly specialized skills and customarily family members—typically women—
have provided care for people with disabilities.1 
This traditional arrangement has come under significant stress as a result of steady 
demographic and socio-cultural changes. Life expectancy has increased, and with it the 
probability of needing LTC, while fertility has fallen and female labor force participation 
has expanded, reducing the pool of family caregivers. In response, developed countries 
have designed social LTC programs, with an average cost of 1.7 percent of GDP in public 
expenditure in 11 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries (OECD, 2015). 
There are two fundamental reasons why LTC will become a more pressing issue in Latin 
America within the following decades. First, although its population is younger today than 
the world average, Latin America is aging faster than any other region in the world. 
Second, there is a body of evidence that shows that its future elderly populations will be 
prone to dependency situations that require LTC. Life expectancy in Latin America has 
increased without experiencing the same improvements in living standards and nutrition 
as the advanced economies (Palloni et al., 2006). As a result, the region’s population is 
more prone to obesity, hypertension, arthritis, and high cholesterol, which increases the 
probability of early aging and the need for care (Al Snih et al., 2010; Medici, 2011; Matus-
López, 2015).  
The literature on long-term care insurance (LTCI) is rather skeptical regarding the 
competence of private markets to satisfy the needs for LTC. In addition to typical market 
failures of insurance markets such as adverse selection and moral hazard, LTCI are 
vulnerable to several sources of common shocks, especially duration of LTC needs and 
                                                             
1  Throughout this paper, “disability” refers to a situation where a person experiences a long-term 






future costs. For example, De la Maisonneuve and Oliveira Martins (2013) estimate 
future costs of LTC in OECD countries and forecast that costs could vary by as much as 
5 percent of GDP depending on the scenario. On the demand side, the cost of insurance 
is rather high for middle and low income families, and it is likely that people would rather 
allocate additional income to retirement funds, general savings or other sources which, 
unlike LTCI, are non-contingent. Moreover, the complexity of LTCI contracts makes it 
difficult to assess value for money (Colombo et al., 2011). In addition, the empirical 
literature on the effect of incentives on insurance take-up shows that the latter is either 
hardly responsive (Brown, Coe and Finkelstein, 2007; Bergquist, Costa-Font and Swartz, 
2015) or fails to compensate programs costs (Courtemanche and He, 2009; Goda, 
2011). 
Motivated by the low take-up of LTCI and the intrinsic market failures in this market, a 
strong case has been made in favor of social insurance programs for LTC (Barr, 2010). 
Advanced economies have responded to their own aging societies by designing such 
schemes. Overall, the experience of high income countries provides valuable insights on 
possible alternatives, although adoption of such programs in Latin America is not 
straightforward. Fiscal constraints, the limited supply of LTC services by existing public 
health service providers, and the lack of regulated private LTC markets are of particular 
concern. But absent any insurance scheme, families in Latin America would have to bear 
the costs of LTC by themselves. This is something that poor, vulnerable and most 
middle-income families cannot afford, so the likelihood of some type of policy response 
will increase as the region’s population ages. 
These affordability concerns motivated us to develop a formal model to study the cost-
effectiveness of LTC programs. Albeit simple, our model gives valuable insights. In a 
context where families respond to the need of LTC by providing care themselves or by 
purchasing care in a market, we first find that poor families have a preference for in-cash 
subsidies, making pro-poor programs more effective when they allow for cash transfers. 
Second, we show that when people differ in their valuation of LTC services, allowing 
people to choose between in-kind or in-cash subsidies reduces the total cost of the 
program. Though we study these elements of design in a simple context, we argue that 
these results are very robust, as they are applications of well-established results in 
economics. 





on population aging and the health of aging cohorts in LAC, which drives future demand 
of LTC. We then discuss the prospects for LTC policy in section 3, with particular 
emphasis on the rationale for public policy, its motivations and the restrictions behind it. 
Section 4 features our model on the effect of in-cash and in-kind subsidies, and our 
corresponding assessment on the cost-effectiveness of the programs. We close the 
paper with several concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. Future Need for LTC in Latin America 
The last century or so has issued forth steady demographic changes worldwide. On the 
one hand, better living standards and improvements in technology and medicine have 
increased life expectancy. This has been accompanied by complex socio-cultural 
changes, such as the increase in female labor participation and falling fertility rates. The 
implication of these phenomena has been a persistent aging of the population. Figure 1 
shows the process of population aging for different regions of the world since 1950 (the 
earliest year with homogenous data worldwide). The process has been steady and 
generalized worldwide in recent history. 
Figure 1. Share of Elderly Population Worldwide 
 






We can see that Latin America is still young compared to developed countries, and even 
slightly younger than the world average; however, its rate of aging is among the highest. 
According to Kinsella and Phillips (2005), it took France 115 years and Sweden 85 years 
to change the share of the population over 60 from 7 percent to 14 percent, while Brazil 
and Colombia will need only 21 and 20 years, respectively.  
Figure 2 shows that population aging is occurring in all countries in the region. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable variation between countries in terms of the overall 
elderly population rate and the rate of aging. 
Figure 2. Share of Elderly Population in Latin America and the Caribbean  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on United Nations (2017). 
 
Although Latin America’s population is aging quickly, Figure 1 reveals that aging levels 
similar to those of the advanced economies in 2000 will be reached in the region not long 
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around 15% or more by 2030. Overall, in terms of the fertility rate, life expectancy, and 
share of population over 65, some countries in Latin America are reaching the stage that 
OECD countries had when they embarked in major reforms to their LTC systems (Matus-
López, 2015). 
Although population is aging in Latin America, it is possible, at least in theory, for future 
demand of LTC to fall in spite of increasing life expectancy. This will happen if the health 
status with which people reach advanced age improves as well. The literature has 
developed an interesting hypothesis regarding the health profile of the upcoming 
generations of elderly in Latin America. Palloni et al. (2006) note that the new elderly will 
have been a result of large improvements in control and mitigation of the effects of 
infectious and water-borne diseases. These improvements, however, were not 
accompanied by substantial increases in standards of living, since poverty and 
malnutrition were still widespread. As a result, Palloni and Souza (2013) believe that 
people becoming elderly will be more fragile, with greater prevalence of adult chronic 
conditions and excess mortality risk. This contrasts with the situation when developed 
countries reached a similar stage in the demographic transition, where the population 
aged under better socioeconomic conditions. For example, education levels and average 
income were higher in OECD countries 20 or 30 years ago than the values today in the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries that are reaching similar demographic transition 
thresholds. 
There is a considerable body of evidence that documents the link between early-life 
conditions and adult health. Palloni et al. (2006) find a link between childhood nutritional 
status and diabetes, and rheumatic fever and heart disease, albeit the former relation is 
not strong. Similarly, Monteverde, Noronha and Palloni (2009) find that poor early 
conditions, defined both in terms of child health and socioeconomic status, induce higher 
rates of disability. McEniry (2013) reviews 20 studies regarding the link between early 
life conditions and adult health. Her findings indicate that several measures of adverse 
early life conditions, such as malnutrition, incidence of certain illnesses, and poor 
socioeconomic status have a strong effect on measures of health at a later age, such as 
decreased cognition, incidence of heart disease, disability, and mortality rates. 
Tables A1, A2 and A3 show the prevalence of several diseases that commonly lead to 
needing LTC. The tables show that the rate of obesity in Latin America is the highest of 





old-age dementia is more common in Latin America than in any other region. Though we 
interpret these diseases as indicators of a high likelihood of needing LTC, again in theory, 
mortality risk may reduce the length of time in which dependents need LTC and total 
LTC demand. 
To assess whether this is likely, we look at the evolution in life expectancy and healthy 
life expectancy in the region. Table 1 shows these values at birth for 27 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries in the years 2000 and 2015. Both life expectancy and healthy 
life expectancy have increased in all countries in the period under study. Column (7) 
shows that life expectancy has increased more than healthy life expectancy in all but two 
countries (Uruguay and Mexico). Table A4 in the Appendix shows the same table for life 
expectancy and total life expectancy at age 60, largely leading to the same conclusion.  
Table 1. Years of Total Life Expectancy and Healthy Life Expectancy at Birth 
















Antigua and Barbuda 66.9 64.6 2.3 75.0 72.5 2.5 0.2 
Argentina 68.2 65.7 2.5 76.8 74.0 2.8 0.3 
Bahamas 66.7 63.7 3.0 75.6 72.0 3.6 0.6 
Barbados 66.8 65.1 1.7 75.5 73.4 2.1 0.4 
Belize 62.3 61.0 1.3 70.3 68.7 1.6 0.3 
Bolivia 62.7 56.0 6.7 71.2 63.3 7.9 1.2 
Brazil 65.8 61.5 4.3 74.9 69.9 5.0 0.7 
Chile 69.6 67.8 1.8 79.4 77.1 2.3 0.5 
Colombia 66.8 63.4 3.4 74.9 71.1 3.8 0.4 
Costa Rica 70.7 69.0 1.7 79.4 77.4 2.0 0.3 
Cuba 69.6 67.7 1.9 78.8 76.6 2.2 0.3 
Dominican Republic 64.9 61.8 3.1 73.3 69.7 3.6 0.5 
Ecuador 67.6 64.3 3.3 76.3 72.7 3.6 0.3 
Grenada 64.6 62.4 2.2 73.3 70.6 2.7 0.5 
Guatemala 63.9 59.1 4.8 72.9 67.6 5.3 0.5 
Haiti 55.1 50.3 4.8 63.3 58.1 5.2 0.4 
Honduras 66.6 62.8 3.8 75.0 71.1 3.9 0.1 
Jamaica 66.7 64.1 2.6 75.8 72.6 3.2 0.6 
Mexico 67.4 65.6 1.8 76.2 74.5 1.7 -0.1 
Panama 69.3 67.4 1.9 77.9 75.8 2.1 0.2 
Paraguay 65.1 62.7 2.4 74.1 71.1 3.0 0.6 
Peru 67.2 63.3 3.9 75.6 71.3 4.3 0.4 
Saint Lucia 66.3 63.6 2.7 75.4 72.2 3.2 0.5 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
63.6 62.3 1.3 72.3 70.9 1.4 0.1 
Sao Tome and Principe 60.5 55.3 5.2 68.5 62.9 5.6 0.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 63.1 61.2 1.9 71.7 69.4 2.3 0.4 
Uruguay 68.7 66.6 2.1 76.8 74.8 2.0 -0.1 
Venezuela 65.9 64.3 1.6 73.9 72.2 1.7 0.1 





Average 65.8 63.0 2.9 74.4 71.2 3.2 0.4 
Source: World Health Organization (WHO; 2016). 
Note: The equivalent lost healthy year fractions required for the healthy life expectancy calculation 
are estimated as the all-cause rate of years lost because of disability per capita, adjusted for 
independent comorbidity by age, sex, and country. See WHO (2016) for details. 
In comparison, in 2000 life expectancy at birth in Europe was 72.5 years, and healthy life 
expectancy was 64.2. This is roughly comparable to the same indicators for Latin 
America and the Caribbean on 2015. In 2015, these figures rose to 77.2 and 68.1 in 
Europe, implying that the gap between life expectancy and healthy life expectancy 
increased by 0.5 years. Although this is a simplistic interpretation, if Latin America were 
to follow the same path as Europe with a 15-year lag, we would expect the gap between 
life expectancy and healthy life expectancy to keep widening. 
All in all, we take this evidence to be indicative of the future rise in LTC demand. The 
thrust of this rise will be given by population aging. Regarding the health status of future 
generations of elderly, this may reduce future need for LTC either because conditions 
have improved enough to reduce LTC, or because health status has worsened to the 
point in which LTC need is offset by greater mortality risk. Though we do not have the 
information that would be necessary to assess these issues in detail, aggregate evidence 
seems to indicate that neither of these channels is strong enough to increase healthy life 
expectancy more than life expectancy. 
3. Current State of LTC in Latin America and Possibilities for LTC Policies 
3.1. The State of LTC in Latin America 
Most of the countries in the region have institutions and policies for seniors, and some 
have advanced in regulations that include aspects related to dependency care. However, 
comprehensive LTC policies are virtually nonexistent and regulation or direct provision 
by the public sector is scarce (Gascón and Redondo 2014). Some countries have made 
progress with specific interventions, in which they have defined quality criteria to achieve 
the accreditation of institutions providing care services, as well as monitoring and 
evaluation schemes. One country (Uruguay) has defined a National Integrated Care 
System that includes LTC, but its interventions prioritize infant care.  
Moreover, the region lacks a private LTCI market. We think that the main reason for this 





most of the population even in advanced countries. In the US and France, considered 
the leading markets in terms of coverage (Colombo et al., 2011), insurance covers about 
5 percent and 15 percent of the population aged 40 or more, respectively. In Germany, 
only about 300,000 insurance policies had been sold before the introduction of 
mandatory insurance in 1995 (Hauschild, 1994). More recently, Arntz et al. (2007) 
estimate that 9 percent of the German population is covered by private LTCI, while 90 
percent is covered by social insurance. Figure 3 shows that the share of private LTCI in 
total LTC spending is very small, even in the countries with the most widespread 
coverage. 
Figure 3. Share of Private Insurance Spending in Total LTC Spending 
 
Source: Colombo et al (2011). 
Note: Article link is: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932401653. 
 
Absent public LTC programs and private LTCI markets, who provides LTC and how are 
LTC arrangements made in Latin America and the Caribbean? A report by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO; 2009) states that only 1 percent of the region’s 
population over 60 lives in nursing homes, and the share that receives formal care at 
home is also low, so remunerated care is rare and concentrated in families with high 
incomes. Hence, care is largely provided by family members, demanding substantial time 
and expense depending on the care requirements of the person in question. Care may 
also strain the household budget if caregivers need to forgo paid work opportunities to 
provide care. 
In Latin America, the burden of care falls disproportionately –almost exclusively-- on 





(Aguirre, 2011), and that women double or triple the amount of time that men dedicate 
to caring for others (ILO, 2009). Figure 4 confirms that although men spend more time 
working for wages, women work more overall, since female work in the home more than 
compensates work for wages. Similarly, González, Raga, and Sibils (2012) establish that 
survey responses from 544 regional opinion leaders indicate consensus that the 
responsibility of care falls mainly on women, as shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 4. Hours per Week spent in paid and non-paid Work. 
 
Source: Rico and Robles (2016) 
Figure 5. Responses by Gender to the Question: “In Your Opinion, in Your 
Country of Residence, Who Is Mainly Responsible for the Care of Dependent 
People, Men or Women?” 
  





Note: Based on a survey answered by 544 opinion leaders in Latin America. 
 
Having laid out a diagnostic of the state of LTC in Latin America, we turn to discuss the 
likelihood of LTC policies being put in place, as well as the most likely objectives for 
these policies. 
3.2. The Room for LTC Policies 
While the increased demand for LTC in the region has been documented, questions 
regarding government involvement remain unresolved. Any discussion of public LTC 
needs to address its financing. Barr (2010) makes the case that actuarial insurance is 
superior to self-insurance and social insurance programs are superior to private ones, 
so there are benefits to instituting social insurance. However, comprehensive LTC 
programs are probably not a priority in Latin America for now. Basic pensions—to ensure 
that the elderly avoid poverty—are still on the region’s to-do list, and so are 
improvements to the health systems to achieve universal coverage and to enact health 
policies to deal with the increase in chronic non-communicable diseases. Hence, LTC 
spending may be seen as a luxury compared with alternative uses of government 
spending. In addition, the design of LTC programs for workers in the formal sector that 
contribute to social security, as is done in traditional pension systems, would leave out 
the region’s most socioeconomically disadvantaged groups that work in the informal 
sector, without access to social security.  
On the other hand, as the senior population grows and the need for LTC becomes more 
prevalent in the region, the demand for and the social return of these programs will rise. 
How will policy makers react to this increased demand? Figure 6 shows that opinion 
leaders in the region think that the public sector should be involved in the care of 












Figure 6. Attitude toward the Claim: “The Following Institution Could Be Involved 
in Care of Dependent People …” 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on González et al (2012). 
Note: Based on a survey answered by 544 opinion leaders in Latin America. 
 
In addition to the issue of whether the government should launch LTC programs based 
on an analysis of social costs and benefits, which is a normative statement, a related 
question is whether and when a government will do so, which demands a positive 
reasoning. As we said before, an active stance on behalf of the government is to be 
expected as demand for LTC grows. However, several factors in the policy making 
process may speed the development of LTC programs. The fact that the region is early 
in its demographic transition implies that most of the costs of LTC programs would be 
deferred, and short-term political capitalization of programs is likely. Even if other policies 
might have higher social returns, the decision making process will possibly lead to some 
sort of public intervention regarding elderly care in general and LTC in particular. These 
arguments lead us to believe that there is a large probability that LTC programs will be 
deployed sooner rather than later. 
There are at least three vital aspects of LTC policy that must be dealt with. The first is 





norms is to set standards for LTC provision, like defining the responsibilities of 
caregivers, the training that is necessary to provide each type of care, and so on. In 
addition, regulation is also needed to facilitate a market for care, with a special focus on 
the supply side. We believe these aspects would better be addressed from the 
perspective of health economics, and so we will not discuss the issue further in this 
paper. 
The second aspect is to define a target population for LTC programs. At first, it seems 
that LTC policies are necessary for all people who reach a stage of dependency. 
However, one key aspect that defines at least two distinct segments is affordability. For 
dependents who can afford LTC, addressing regulatory aspects alone will go to great 
lengths. On the other hand, policies aimed at relieving the burden for families who cannot 
afford LTC will demand a more proactive stance from the government. The third element 
is how to finance LTC, which we discuss separately for each of these segments below. 
First, we discuss LTC policies for families who can afford it. The literature on LTC has 
made the case that actuarial insurance is superior to self-insurance and social insurance 
programs are superior to private ones, so there are benefits to instituting social insurance 
(Barr, 2010). As has been shown previously, coverage of LTCI is typically very low, and 
there are multiple factors that contribute to this. On the demand side, Colombo et al. 
(2011) note that the complexity of insurance contracts makes it difficult for the insured to 
assess value for money, and skepticism exists about whether people can actually make 
informed choices regarding insurance for LTC (Barr, 2010). In addition, there is 
considerable evidence that the elderly prefer aging in their family homes (Perez et al., 
2001; Olsberg, 2005; Wiles et al., 2011; Chomik and MacLennan, 2014), possibly leading 
to a lower demand for LTCI as a way to avoid being sent to nursing homes by family 
members (Barr, 2010). Finally, evidence shows that demand is very unresponsive to 
economic incentives (Courtemance and He, 2009; Goda, 2011; Bergquist, Costa-Font 
and Swartz, 2015; Brown, Coe and Finkelstein, 2007). 
On the supply side, insurers face several problems that put pressure on costs. The first 
are problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. However, these problems are 
common to practically all insurance markets, and they are unlikely to preclude the rise of 
an LTCI market alone. A more important factor is that LTCI providers face at least two 
sources of common shocks. The first is the possibility that unforeseen changes in life 





uncertainty regarding the future costs of care. It is generally believed that costs of labor 
intensive tasks such as LTC will rise because productivity increases in these sectors lag 
those of the rest of the economy. However, this gap is difficult to predict. De la 
Maisonneuve and Oliveira Martins (2013) forecast that, in OECD countries, costs could 
vary by as much as 5 percent of GDP depending on the scenario. 
In addition, Latin American countries have a long history of macroeconomic instability, 
and spikes in defaults of insurance payments should not be discarded. Moreover, 
compulsory take-up of LTCI will not come without additional problems. Mandatory take-
up of workers is unlikely to reach informal workers, who typically account for over one 
third of the labor force. Under universal pension programs, mandatory LTCI is applicable, 
but take-up at such a late age will put pressure on premiums and decrease disposable 
income of the elderly. 
By comparison, social insurance schemes share many of the risks of private insurers. 
Increases in life expectancy or episodes of economics crises may generate a large 
mismatch between revenues and LTC spending. However, growth and technological 
progress will boost revenues, and this will probably be enough to cover increases in 
costs associated to the Baumol disease. All in all, it is not clear that private insurers have 
a competitive advantage over social insurance schemes. Social insurance programs 
have to their advantage that these are the norm in advanced countries, and there are 
valuable insights to be gained from those experiences. 
As for families who cannot afford care, we think this is a more natural starting point to 
start thinking about LTC policies. One reason is that starting at a smaller scale is 
operationally advantageous before more comprehensive programs are put in place. 
Moreover, policies in the region have put a great emphasis on relieving poverty, of which 
the burden associated with LTC is an aggravating circumstance. Thus, LTC policies for 
the poor would be consistent with the present agenda, and can leverage the institutional 
infrastructure and acquired know-how of other welfare programs. 
As in any targeted program, LTC policies for the poor first require a targeting mechanism 
to identify who can and cannot afford LTC. Given that the inherent wealth of a person is 
a largely unobservable factor, policymakers must rely on observable and verif iable 
characteristics, such as income, age, assets, and labor market status, to determine 
eligibility. This gives rise to a trade-off between inclusion and exclusion errors—the 





who should have received it. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, high informality largely impedes means testing as 
a targeting mechanism. However, most countries in the region implement conditional 
cash transfers to poor households, with eligibility based on proxy means-tests. These 
are an improvement over alternative targeting mechanisms, but targeting challenges 
remain. Overall, the fitness of specific characteristics to evaluate affordability varies 
widely in different countries, and assessment should be done on a case-by-case basis. 
Another element of any LTC program is an assessment of the level of dependency of 
potential beneficiaries, which varies according to the standards defined in each country 
and sets LTC programs apart from generic income support programs. Well-designed 
programs therefore require an objective and transparent beneficiary evaluation and the 
involvement of several actors, such as healthcare systems.  
The structure of the public intervention itself is another consideration. The first option is 
for programs to subsidize the funding of an insurance fund (ex-ante) or to cover 
expenses as they take place (ex-post). In the first case, governments subsidize take-up 
of private LTCI. However, as discussed above, it is not clear that LTCI has a competitive 
advantage over social insurance schemes, and ex-ante insurance would take care of the 
next generation of the elderly, but not of the elderly in this generation. Moreover, even 
small copayments of LTCI are likely to deter low-income families, while it seems more 
likely that families will contribute to the cost of LTC in case they do need it. For these 
reasons, granting ex-post subsidies in the event of LTC need is presumably a more 
adequate element if LTC programs are designed for the poor.  
In terms of financing, given the premise that the program is oriented towards poor 
families, we presume the cost of LTC programs comes from general revenues. However, 
fiscal stances in Latin America are not in the position of largesse that they were in 
recently, and we expect LTC policies to have restricted budgets. In said context, it will 
become necessary for policy makers to adopt schemes that maximize the cost-
effectiveness of LTC programs. 
The last element of subsidies is whether these are in-kind, in-cash or a combination of 
both. Programs granting cash subsidies seem appropriate to meet the dual goal of 
providing care and easing the financial burden on poor families. On the other hand, there 





example if care is too complex to be provided by family members and unaffordable for 
them. If this were the case, families would be better off with in-kind subsidies. We believe 
this a central element in the design of an LTC program for the poor. Accordingly, we 
dedicate the next section to analyze the effectiveness of cash-for-care and in-kind care 
programs for the poor. Our study yields clear conclusions regarding their overall welfare 
effect and overall program costs. 
4. LTC Provision: A Simple Model 
4.1. The Model 
In this section, we develop a simple model to set the discussion on some features of an 
LTC system. We build a simple model that focuses on the effects of cash vis-à-vis in-
kind services, in the context of a targeted LTC program. It is noteworthy that little 
attention has been put into the effects of LTC program design. One notable exception is 
Canta, Cremer and Gahvari (2016), who analyze the crowding out of family care as a 
result of LTC policies in the context of uncertain child altruism. 
Our model aims to deliver results on two main aspects. First, we set out to answer what 
type of subsidy is better suited for the poor and vulnerable, cash transfers or in-kind 
services. Second, since budget restrictions are an important constraining factor, the 
model is intended to identify how to boost the cost-effectiveness of this type of program. 
For the remainder of this section, we will assume that the population of beneficiaries has 
already been selected, although we will discuss this issue further in the next subsection.  
To begin, we assume each family has the following composition: There is one individual 
who needs an amount 𝑥 of care. We can think of 𝑥 as the hours of care needed in a 
given time interval; the greater 𝑥 is, the more attention the dependent family member 
requires. The family purchases 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0 units of care in the market at a price 𝑤𝑚 and 
provides 𝑥𝑓 ≥ 0 units of care itself. We assume 𝑥𝑚 and 𝑥𝑓 are perfect substitutes. We 
think this is the natural starting point to begin assessing LTC policies, as, historically, 
formal LTC arrangements have taken the place of informal ones. What is more, this is 
consistent with an extensive empirical research that finds a substitutability relation 
between formal and informal care (La Sasso and Johnson, 2002; Van Houtven and 
Norton, 2004; Bonsang, 2009). Moreover, analyses based on exploiting regional 
variation in availability of public programs show decreases in formal home care 
(McKnight, 2006) and increases in informal care (Golberstein, et al. 2009) in response 





non-substitutability further below. 
Utility is defined at the family level and depends on income available for consumption of 
goods other than LTC, and utility delivered by leisure. Family income is the product 
between the supply of work 𝑙 and the market wage 𝑤𝑙. We assume the market wage is 
different for each family so that we can study how behavior changes in different income 
groups. Moreover, we assume the wages belong to the interval [𝑤𝑙 , 𝑤𝑙], with 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚 <
𝑤𝑙. This implies that families can earn wages above or below the cost of care. In practice, 
we assume the upper bound on wages is not too much higher than 𝑤𝑚, as the program 
is targeted towards the poor. To keep matters simple, we assume the utility function has 
the following Cobb-Douglas form 
𝑢 = 𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝛺 − (𝑙 + 𝑥𝑓))  
which is subject to the following budget constraint: 
𝑌 = 𝑙 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚 
Where 𝑌 is income available for consumption and 𝛺 is the maximum amount of time 
available, so that 𝛺 − (𝑙 + 𝑥𝑓) is the amount of free time. Let us define this magnitude as 
𝐿 for leisure. We assume LTC needs are not high enough to take up all available time, 
that is 𝛺 > 𝑥. Given the Cobb-Douglas form, this ensures a solution where some time is 
left for leisure and some for work. Now we can define the family’s utility maximization 
problem (UMP) as 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝛺 − (𝑙 + 𝑥𝑓))   
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑌 = 𝑙 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚   𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓  𝑙 + 𝑥𝑓 ≤ 𝛺   
We can rewrite this problem as the following Lagrangian 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚) + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥𝑓)  + 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥) + 𝜆𝛺(𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥𝑓) 
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𝑤𝑚 + 𝜆𝑥 ≤ 0; 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑚 (−
𝛼
𝑌
𝑤𝑚 + 𝜆𝑥) = 0 (3) 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜆𝑥
= 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥) = 0 (4) 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜆𝛺
= 𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝛺 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝛺(𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥𝑓) = 0 (5) 
 
As we said before, our assumptions ensure that 𝑙 + 𝑥𝑓 ≤ 𝛺 and so we will disregard FOC 
(5).  
The solution to this problem depends on the relevant parameters for the family in 
question. The following result shows that the decision to hire care or provide it by the 
family depends crucially on the relation between 𝑤𝑙 and 𝑤𝑚. 
Lemma 1. 
(i) Assume that the market wage for a family is higher than the cost of buying care 
at the market: 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚; then 𝑥𝑓 = 0, the family does not provide any care directly 
and purchases all the necessary care in the market 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥.  
(ii) Assume that the market wage for a family is lower than the cost of buying care at 
the market: 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚; then 𝑥𝑚 = 0, the family does not buy care services and 
delivers all the necessary care itself 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥. 
(iii) Assume that the market wage for a family is equal to the cost of buying care at 
the market: 𝑤𝑙 = 𝑤𝑚; then 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0 and 𝑥𝑓 ≥ 0, the family may buy care at the 
market, provide it directly, or both, with  𝑥𝑓 + 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥. 
Proof of Lemma 1. See Appendix. 
 
Our results indicate that the choice between family-based care and market care depends 
on the relation between the wage of the family and the cost of buying care at the market. 
Families whose least productive member may get a wage higher than the cost of hiring 





themselves. This is because families with low wage rates have a lower opportunity cost 
of providing care, and so they would rather provide care themselves. In doing so, it is as 
if the family could receive a wage rate 𝑤𝑚 for the first 𝑥 units of work. On the contrary, 
families with income above 𝑤𝑚 would rather hire paid caregivers and work for wages. 
That most families choose only one type of care stems from family care being a perfect 
substitute of market care and the disutility of family caregiving being the same as working 
for wages. We could add imperfect substitutability between family care and market care, 
or we could suppose that the productivity of family care is decreasing, for example, 
because the care needed by the patient becomes more complex or specialized. In these 
cases, the possibility that the families opt for a mix of market and family care would 
become more likely. However, the principle that richer families would rely more on market 
care and poorer families on family care still holds, so there is little to learn in our model 
from relaxing these assumptions. We will discuss the issue further in the next subsection. 
We now include public subsidies, studying first the effect of in-kind subsidies. We 
assume the family receives 𝑠 units of care, 𝑠 ≤ 𝑥. We also implicitly assume that the 
institution granting the subsidy can observe the value 𝑥. This assumption is plausible if 
the value 𝑥 can be inferred by examining the dependency level of the beneficiary. In a 
more realistic setting, the agency responsible for the LTC may only observe a noisy 
indicator of 𝑥, or the dependent may influence the value of 𝑥 reported. We will comment 
on these possible extensions in the following section, and continue assuming 𝑥 is 
observable for now. Moreover, we do not assume any particular structure for 𝑠, although 
it could be a fixed value for all families or it could depend on 𝑥 (but not on 𝑥𝑚 or 𝑥𝑓). We 
will disregard the restriction 𝑙 + 𝑥𝑓 ≤ 𝛺, since we know it is nonbinding. Now the UMP is  
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚) + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿  + 𝜆𝑥 (𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − (𝑥 − 𝑠)) 
Note that the structure of the problem is essentially unaltered. All we have done is reduce 
the amount of care the dependent requires. However, the choice of how to provide care 
has not changed. We state this formally in the following result. 
Lemma 2. In the presence of an in-kind subsidy 𝑠 ≤ 𝑥, such that 𝑥 − 𝑠 ≥ 0 must still be 
provided, this level of care is provided following the rules (i), (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1. 
Proof. See Appendix. 





themselves, and so the marginal cost of working is lower. This implies that they spend 
more time working for wages, and so they accommodate the extra time available in a 
mix between increased leisure and disposable income. Rich families must now pay for 
less care themselves, freeing up part of their income. Since the marginal utility of income 
is decreasing, their behavior adjusts by decreasing work and enjoying more leisure. 
Next, we assume the subsidy is in cash. To keep both types of subsidies comparable, 
we assume that the subsidy is 𝑆 = 𝑠 𝑤𝑚, that is, the subsidy equals the cost of the in-
kind subsidy provided earlier and is thus the same for all families. The UMP is now 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚) + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿  + 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥) 
Again, the structure of the problem has not changed very much, and results (i), (ii) and 
(iii) will also hold. 
Lemma 3. In the presence of a cash subsidy 𝑆 such that 𝑆 ≤ 𝑥 𝑤𝑚, and assuming the 
subsidy or the LTC need are not large enough to discourage work altogether in the case 
𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚, results (i), (ii) and (iii) hold. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
In comparison to the previous Lemmas, the results of Lemma 3 are altered somewhat 
by the possibility that LTC needs are so high that the disutility of providing care is high 
enough to generate a positive value of 𝑥𝑚. However, this also implies that 𝑙 = 0, and so 
families rely only on the subsidy to pay for care and for their own consumption. We view 
these implications as unrealistic, as we find it more reasonable to expect families to work 
at least a minimum amount. Moreover, this case would require LTC needs to be 
catastrophic, in the sense that 𝑥 would be rather close to 𝛺 (see Mathematical Appendix 
for greater detail). In what follows, we assume this case in only an extreme example, and 
that the most likely rules by which care is provided are (i), (ii) and (iii). 
If the rules according to which families make decisions have not changed, how does the 
cash subsidy differ from the in-kind subsidy? One aspect in which the two regimes differ 
is in their effect on labor supply. We saw that poor families responded to the in-kind 
subsidy by working more, because care reduced the marginal disutility of labor. In the 
case of cash subsidies, however, poor families reduce their labor supply. This is because 
the subsidy increases their income and the marginal utility from working thus falls. 
Therefore, poor families respond to the in-cash subsidy by working less when compared 





income reduces the marginal utility of labor and so the labor supply is reduced.  
Another interesting dimension is the welfare change induced by both types of subsidy 
policies. For rich families, the policies differ in the amount of care they hire themselves. 
With the in-kind subsidy, they would hire 𝑥 − 𝑠 units of care, while they hire 𝑥 units with 
the cash subsidies. We can prove that this difference of behavior implies no welfare 
change. 
Lemma 4. For families with 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚, an in-kind subsidy 𝑠 and an in-cash subsidy 𝑆 =
𝑠 𝑤𝑚 are equivalent in terms of welfare. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
We have shown that rich families are indifferent between both types of subsidies. The 
reason is that care is provided at the market price regardless of the form of the subsidy. 
For poor families, however, the type of subsidy does affect the type of care delivered. 
Under the in-cash subsidy, all the care is provided by the family. Under the in-kind 
subsidy, on the other hand, only a fraction of the care is provided by the family. We can 
prove that imposing this restriction makes poor families worse-off with the in-kind subsidy 
when compared to the in-cash subsidy, as they forego the surplus created by the 𝑤𝑚  −
 𝑤𝑙  >  0 differential. 
Lemma 5. For families with 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚, an in-cash subsidy 𝑆 is preferable to an in-kind 
subsidy 𝑠 = 𝑆
𝑤𝑚
. 
Proof. See Appendix.  
The previous result shows that in-cash subsidies are preferable to in-kind subsidies, for 
poor families. The reason is that, unlike what happens with rich families, in-kind subsidies 
do affect the price at which poor families provide care. For poor families, the cost of 
providing care themselves is lower than market price, hence their utility gain. This should 
not come as a surprise since, as the previous proof shows, it is only an application of the 
revealed preference theorem. 
Our results show that in-cash subsidies are as good as in-kind subsidies for rich families, 
and better for poor families. The question is then if there is a rationale for in-kind 
subsidies at all. We now show that when families have different valuations for the in-kind 
subsidy, a set of menu contracts in which one provides in-kind subsidies and another 





but at a lower cost. From this point on, we will refer to those families with 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚  as 
“low-valuation families” and those families with 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚 as “high-valuation families.” 
Note that in our model the different valuation for the in-kind subsidy is given by 
differences in income level, as families with lower income are more likely to have a 
market wage smaller than the cash transfer. Nevertheless, when interpreting the results, 
we will focus on the differences in valuation of the families, and not on the differences in 
their income levels, since these results apply to any source of heterogeneity in valuation. 
For example, valuation of in-kind services could be related to the complexity of care 
required, with families preferring in-kind services for more complex care. We will return 
to this issue in the discussion in the next subsection. 
Lemma 6. Let 𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆) be the indirect utility function with an in-cash subsidy 𝑆 and 𝑈𝑖𝑘(𝑠) 
be the indirect utility function with an in-kind subsidy 𝑠 = 𝑆/𝑤𝑚. For families with 𝑤𝑙 <
𝑤𝑚, there exists a unique 𝑆∗ < 𝑆 such that   𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆∗) = 𝑈𝑖𝑘(𝑠). 
Proof. See Appendix.  
This result implies that the low-valuation families are willing to accept a discount in 
exchange for the subsidy being in cash. High-valuation families, however, would not, 
because they are indifferent between both types of subsidies if their value in terms of 
market units of care is the same. The core of this result does not stem from the fact that 
different families have different income levels. Instead, it arises because families have a 
different valuation of the in-kind subsidy. Because low-valuation families can provide 
care at a lower cost, their valuation of the in-kind subsidy is low. Naturally, the opposite 
is true for families with 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚. 
This result explains why several LTC programs are designed as menu contracts where 
beneficiaries can choose between an in-kind subsidy and a cash transfer with a discount. 
One contract, designed for those with the higher valuation for care, would include an in-
kind subsidy, while the other would offer a cash transfer with a lower value. Since the 
high-valuation families would use the cash subsidy to purchase care, they would rather 
choose the more valuable in-kind subsidy. The low-valuation families, however, would 
choose the cash subsidy, because its value is greater than the cost of providing care 
themselves. Again, this kind of result has been well studied within economics: it is an 
application of a discriminating monopoly where valuation for the good is unobservable. 





too strongly on our simplistic assumptions. Moreover, there are several possible ways in 
which to extend the model. We therefore dedicate the following subsection to discussing 
the robustness of the results and possible extensions. 
4.2. Robustness, Extensions and Discussion of the Results 
We have built a simple, tractable model to assess the effect of several variables on the 
decision of how to provide care. It is important to bear in mind that our model was 
motivated by two conjectures. The first is that LTC programs will be deployed in the 
region in a reasonably near future. The second is that there are obstacles to universal 
programs, and so, targeting those who cannot afford LTC seems a more reasonable 
objective for programs. Although we have discussed the reasonability of these 
hypotheses, we have otherwise taken them to be true. In what follows, we discuss our 
results more generally, and whether they are still relevant outside of this setting. 
Our model indicates that the type of care provided depends crucially on the income level 
of the family. This is because relatively poor families have a low opportunity cost of 
providing care and choose to provide it themselves. For those who are somewhat better 
off, however, it makes more sense to work for wages and spend this money on hiring 
care. 
A point to be raised against the setup of the model is that families cannot supply care at 
the market rate 𝑤𝑚. This is harmful for poor families, which could increase their income 
if this wage level was available to them. But families do have working opportunities, be 
it in the care sector or otherwise, and so our model is analogous to one in which there 
are some costs to provide formal care on the market. These costs may stem from the 
fact that a market for LTC requires a body of regulations and standards that will inevitably 
generate some type of costs to suppliers. Though a regulatory framework is necessary 
for the LTC market, this reasoning shows that excessive regulation is likely to have a 
regressive effect.   
Our results indicate a few main points to explore further, the first being the preference 
for in-cash subsidies. This comes as no surprise, since an inclination toward lump-sum 
transfers is well established in economics. In the context of our model, the motivation 
behind the simultaneous existence of in-cash and in-kind subsidies is nontrivial, since 
these allow for a screening design that would be impossible with either type of subsidy 





argued that poor families have a strict preference for cash, and this preference implies a 
willingness to accept it a discount, which naturally translates into cost savings. 
In practice, however, policymakers are more likely to opt for in-kind subsidies based on 
other reasons. For example, the general public may be more receptive toward in-kind 
than in-cash policies because of paternalistic preferences, the distrust in the use of 
money by the cash subsidy recipients, or a belief that in-kind care is subject to higher 
standards and is of better quality than care bought in the market. To address the quality 
of care issue, many countries offer training and support programs to family caregivers. 
Additionally, the government, or any other institution in charge of hiring care, could 
receive sizable discounts by purchasing large amounts of care. 
In addition, there is reason to believe that in-kind and in-cash subsidies are different in 
several political economy aspects. The management of in-kind subsidy probably requires 
a larger administrative structure, and affects the visibility of officials in charge of LTC 
programs. Moreover, the greater the involvement of the public sector in LTC, the greater 
the benefit of political capture and clientelism. Last, as we have explained, regulation is 
a necessary aspect for the LTC policies, and the possibility that it may be affected by the 
interests of particular stakeholders is a legitimate concern. 
The effect of differences in income levels between families is that these families have 
different valuations for in-kind services. Those with higher incomes prefer in-kind 
subsidies because they have a higher valuation for this service, not because they are 
rich. However, those with low income prefer in-cash subsidies because they have a low 
valuation of the in-kind subsidies. The result by which menu contracts permit lower 
program costs is robust to any source of differential valuation. For example, if families 
valued in-kind services differently because of clinical (e.g., different degrees of disability 
or complexity of treatment), social (e.g., reluctance to accept care from family members), 
or economic reasons, the cost-saving result would remain unchanged. This result is 
analogous to a discriminating monopoly that cannot observe the individual valuation for 
the good it provides; the design of menu contracts lets families self-select themselves 
into categories, based on their differences in valuation. 
Another result yielded by our model is that families respond differently to in-kind 
subsidies based on their income level. While in-kind subsidies loosen the budget 
constraint for better-off families, poor families benefit from a relaxation of their time 





while the latter decide to work more as a response to the fall in the disutility of working. 
However, in the case of in-cash subsidies both types of families receive the same income 
effect and respond by working less. 
It should be kept in mind that the results regarding labor supply must be put in the context 
of this simplified model. The effects on labor supply are actually a secondary feature of 
the model, and it is not clear if they would prevail in a more realistic characterization of 
the household structure, the labor market, and the technology for producing household 
services. For example, if LTC has significant economies of scope with other household 
activities, in-kind subsidies are unlikely to free up much time to allow for large increases 
in labor supply. Moreover, changes in labor supply seem less likely under rigid labor 
market contracts. If there are costs to exit and entry into the labor market, low-income 
individuals may stay in the labor force even if it is not economical in the short run. 
Additionally, those for whom access to the labor market is more limited will probably 
provide care if selection on the decision is possible. These considerations deserve 
additional empirical research.  
Moreover, our model has assumed that family care is a perfect substitute for market care. 
Although preliminary evidence indicates that formal and informal care are 
interchangeable, this does not hold for high levels of disability (Bonsang, 2009; Litwin 
and Attias-Donfut, 2009). Research on South Korea indicates that formal and informal 
care are substitutes in the intensive margin, but not in the extensive margin (Kim and 
Lim, 2015). Demand for formal and informal care also responds differently to the use of 
assistive technologies (AT).2 Agree et al. (2005) find that AT substitute informal care but 
complement formal care. Anderson and Wiener (2013) find that the effect depends on 
the type of AT. Overall, they find that AT relieve the need for informal care but do not 
significantly reduce the amount of formal and paid care. 
Under imperfect substitution, the choice of in-kind subsidies would be more frequent for 
low-income people. Additionally, we have paid little attention to family structure. We 
could assume that an elderly spouse is ill-equipped for certain tasks like assisting the 
dependent person with movement or bathing. Relaxing the assumption of substitutability 
                                                             
2 According to the United States Assistive Technology Act of 1988 defines assistive technologies 
as” any product, device, or equipment, modified or customized, that is used to maintain, increase, 
or improve the functional capabilities of individuals.” The World Health Organization has a similar 





will likely bias the family/market mix in favor of the latter. 
In addition, we have assumed that the agency that is responsible for the LTC program 
can assess the level of dependency 𝑥 adequately. However, we believe it is likely that 
agencies will not observe 𝑥 directly, but will rather observe a noisy version of it, like 𝑥′ =
𝑥 + 𝑒. To the extent that the factor 𝑒 is exogenous and that the agency knows the joint 
distribution of 𝑥 and 𝑒, 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑒), the agency can infer the distribution of noise for an 
observed 𝑥′ level, 𝐹(𝑒|𝑥′). This will lead the agency to apply a discount a factor that 
depends on this inferred distribution. On the other hand, if dependents can influence the 
reported level of 𝑥′ at some cost, that is 𝑒 is endogenous, and there is some utility to 
over-reporting (e.g. because caregivers help with household tasks other than LTC), 
families will over-report dependency to the point that marginal costs match marginal 
gains from LTC programs. 
Assuming families value 𝑒 less than care, menu contracts like the ones described in the 
previous section can alleviate the problem of information asymmetry. Under exogenous 
𝑒, an LTC program will generate a screening mechanism, where differences in valuation 
stem from the share of 𝑒 in 𝑥′: the larger 𝑒 for a given 𝑥′, the lower the value of 𝑥𝑠 and 
the larger the discount the family is willing to accept. Under endogenous 𝑒, and assuming 
over-reporting generates a cost 𝑐(𝑒) with 𝑐′ > 0, 𝑐′′ > 0, the setup generates a signaling 
equilibrium, where some families over-report to show they have a high valuation, while 
other families do not over-report to avoid the cost 𝑐(. ), and simply take the discounted 
in-cash subsidy. As was the case in the previous section, the design of menu contracts 
lowers the overall cost of LTC programs. However, unlike in the previous section, menu 
contracts limit the allocation of LTC care towards less productive tasks, addressing an 
inefficiency of a different nature. 
Finally, we have assumed the costs of LTC are limited to the cost of providing care, and 
the wage level for the family is given. In a dynamic setting, we believe that the anticipation 
of having to provide care in the future may have an effect on human capital acquisition 
and future earnings. This is more likely if there are rigid labor regulations that make it 
harder for families to reduce their working hours to make time for LTC. Moreover, if such 
dynamic incentives exist, it may become necessary to extend LTC programs beyond the 
poor, and shift towards universal programs to avoid distortions of LTC programs on the 





5. Concluding Remarks 
Despite the well-known fact that Latin America is aging quickly, policy discussions about 
the many consequences of this process are limited. In addition, available evidence 
indicates that the demand for LTC will soar as this process unravels. The reasons are 
most importantly that demand for LTC naturally grows with an aging population, but also 
a lack of significant progress in living standards and old-age health status. Ours is among 
the first studies to present evidence on aging, theoretical and policy discussions from 
LTC policies in developed countries, their application to the region, and to present a 
formal model to help guide the debate on the type of LTC policies that are feasible for 
the region.  
The theory and empirical evidence on the matter shows that private markets are ill-
equipped to grant insurance beyond specific population groups. As a result, most 
advanced countries have come forth with public social insurance programs. In contrast, 
although most countries have advanced regulations and laws protecting the elderly and 
encouraging healthy and active aging, and some apply programs to support the elderly, 
comprehensive LTC policies are nonexistent in Latin America (with the recent exception 
of Uruguay, which has designed but is yet to implement a LTC system). This means that 
families must rely on other arrangements to provide care, and the existing evidence 
shows that families in the region rely very little on remunerated care. The duty falls on 
family members, with women being the primary source of care.  
As the demand for care rises and the issue of LTC becomes more visible, we expect 
policymakers to come forth with programs designed to guarantee care. One of the 
reasons has to do with political economy concerns. As is the case with any long-term 
public expenditure program, the bulk of costs associated with LTC will happen in the 
future, allowing for short-run political capitalization. Another reason is that LTC programs 
can follow poverty alleviation program schemes. Typically, poverty alleviation programs 
acknowledge that the living standards of certain population groups are below acceptable 
standards, and public programs aim to fill this gap. In this context, need for LTC would 
be understood as an aggravating circumstance, which requires additional assistance 
from governments.  
In view of this possibility, we study the effect of several subsidy schemes by means of a 
formal model. Our model yields several interesting insights. The first is the positive 





households have lower opportunity costs, and therefore find it more affordable to provide 
care themselves than hire a caregiver at market rates. This result indicates that in-cash 
subsidies are likely to be a better match for poverty-alleviation LTC programs. 
Additionally, in programs where eligible families have varying affordability thresholds, 
granting the option between in-kind and in-cash programs is likely to reduce the overall 
cost of the program, as people with lower valuation of in-kind programs are willing to 
accept in-cash programs at a discount.  
We argue that this result is robust to several settings in which families differ in their 
valuation of in-kind care. Some relevant cases that generate differences in valuation of 
care are differences in types of care or severity of disability, noisy observation of 
disability, and endogenous over-reporting of disability level. In all these cases, LTC 
program administrators can use menu designs to filter families with high and low 
valuation and reduce program costs. 
Moreover, we think that  LTC may have an adverse effect on the process of human 
capital acquisition. This problem is aggravated if workers cannot adjust their working load 
in the contingency of having to provide LTC for a family member. To the extent that this 
is true, relieving families of the burden of LTC would have positive dynamic effects. In 
addition, this setting possibly implies that there are benefits from broadening LTC 
programs beyond just the poor. 
In the end, the issue of LTC will move further into the policy agenda in the medium run. 
We hope to have contributed by broadening the discussion and presenting our model 
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Table A1. Obesity rates (aged 18+) 
Africa 9.1 
Southeast Asia 4.6 
Europe 25.3 
Eastern Mediterranean 19.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean 24.1 
Western Pacific 6.7 
World 13.2 
Source: World Health Organization 
 
Table A2. Prevalence of diabetes (aged 20-80) 
Middle East and Northern Africa 11.4 
East Asia and the Pacific 8.6 
Europe and Central Asia 6.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.7 
North America 10.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 
World 8.5 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Table A3. Standardized prevalence of dementia (aged 60+) 
Australasia               6.91    
 Asia Pacific, High Income               5.96    
 East Asia               6.61    
 South Asia               7.70    
 Southeast Asia               7.15    
 Western Europe               6.80    
 Central Europe               4.65    
 USA               5.73    
 Latin America               8.34    
 Sub-Saharan Africa               4.63    







Table A4. Changes in Healthy Life Expectancy and Life Expectancy at age 60 by 
Country from 2000 to 2015 
















Antigua and Barbuda 15.6 14.6 1.0 19.7 18.6 1.1 0.1 
Argentina 17.2 15.9 1.3 21.7 20.2 1.5 0.2 
Bahamas 17.6 16.0 1.6 22.5 20.6 1.9 0.3 
Barbados 15.5 14.6 0.9 19.7 18.7 1.0 0.1 
Belize 13.3 12.9 0.4 17.0 16.6 0.4 0.0 
Bolivia 16.4 13.4 3.0 21.4 17.7 3.7 0.7 
Brazil 16.5 14.2 2.3 21.5 18.7 2.8 0.5 
Chile 17.9 16.6 1.3 23.3 21.6 1.7 0.4 
Colombia 16.9 15.2 1.7 21.7 19.6 2.1 0.4 
Costa Rica 18.9 17.4 1.5 24.0 22.2 1.8 0.3 
Cuba 17.6 16.7 0.9 22.5 21.5 1.0 0.1 
Dominican Republic 17.1 16.1 1.0 21.9 20.8 1.1 0.1 
Ecuador 17.7 16.6 1.1 22.7 21.5 1.2 0.1 
Grenada 14.7 13.2 1.5 19.0 17.1 1.9 0.4 
Guatemala 15.7 14.6 1.1 21.2 19.7 1.5 0.4 
Haiti 13.1 11.6 1.5 17.6 16.0 1.6 0.1 
Honduras 17.0 15.6 1.4 22.3 20.8 1.5 0.1 
Jamaica 17.4 16.2 1.2 22.4 21.0 1.4 0.2 
Mexico 16.9 16.2 0.7 22.0 21.6 0.4 -0.3 
Panama 18.7 17.6 1.1 23.9 22.6 1.3 0.2 
Paraguay 16.3 15.2 1.1 21.2 19.9 1.3 0.2 
Peru 16.8 15.3 1.5 21.5 19.8 1.7 0.2 
Saint Lucia 17.0 15.2 1.8 21.9 19.9 2.0 0.2 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 14.9 14.6 0.3 19.4 19.3 0.1 -0.2 
Sao Tome and Principe 14.1 13.3 0.8 18.3 17.6 0.7 -0.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 15.0 13.7 1.3 19.5 18.0 1.5 0.2 
Uruguay 17.4 16.2 1.2 22.1 20.7 1.4 0.2 
Venezuela 16.9 15.7 1.2 21.5 20.3 1.2 0.0 
        
Average 16.4 15.2 1.3 21.2 19.7 1.5 0.2 
HALE: healthy life expectancy; LE: life expectancy 










(i) Assume that the market wage for a family is higher than the cost of buying care 
at the market: 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚; then the family does not provide any care directly and 
purchases all the necessary care in the market, that is 𝑥𝑓 = 0 and 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥.  
(ii) Assume that the market wage for a family is lower than the cost of buying care at 
the market: 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚; then, the family does not buy care services and delivers all 
the necessary care itself, that is 𝑥𝑚 = 0 and 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥. 
(iii) Assume that the market wage for a family is equal to the cost of buying care at 
the market: 𝑤𝑙 = 𝑤𝑚; then, the family may choose any combination of family and 
market care such that 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0, 𝑥𝑓 ≥ 0, and  𝑥𝑓 + 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that the Cobb-Douglas form implies that disposable 
income and leisure time must be positive, and therefore 𝑙 > 0 and 𝛺 > 𝑙 + 𝑥. This implies 
that the first column of (1) is a strict equality, that the first column of (5) is a strict inequality 







          (1′) 
To prove (i), assume 𝑥𝑚 < 𝑥. Then, because 𝑥𝑓 + 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 𝑥, it must be that 𝑥𝑓 > 0. 
Therefore, the first column of FOC (2) is a strict equality. Inserting this expression into 






𝑤𝑚          (3′)  







Which contradicts the assumption that 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚.Therefore, 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥 and 𝑥𝑓 = 0. 
To prove (ii),  assume 𝑥𝑓 < 𝑥 which implies 𝑥𝑚 > 0, and that FOC (3) is a strict equality 
𝛼
𝑌











𝑤𝑚          (2′) 
Again, this expression contradicts 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚. Therefore 𝑥𝑚 = 0 and 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥. 




= 𝜆𝑥          (2′′) 
Replacing (2′′) and 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑤𝑙 into (1’) yields 
𝛼
𝑌
𝑤𝑙 − 𝜆𝑥 = 0 
Since this expression implies FOC (3) holds, 𝑥𝑚 may be positive. 
The analogous logic holds when assuming 𝑥𝑚 > 0. 
 
Lemma 2. In the presence of an in-kind subsidy 𝑠 ≤ 𝑥, such that 𝑥 − 𝑠 ≥ 0 must still be 
provided, this level of care is provided following the rules (i), (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let 𝑥′ = 𝑥 − 𝑠. We can write the Lagrangian of the UMP as 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚) + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥𝑓)  + 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥
′) 
Which is analogous to the previous problem. Hence, if 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚 then 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥′ and 𝑥𝑓 =
0, if 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚 then 𝑥𝑚 = 0 and 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥′, and if 𝑤𝑙 = 𝑤𝑚 then 𝑥𝑓 ≥ 0 and 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0 with 
𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥
′. 
Lemma 3. In the presence of an in cash subsidy 𝑆 such that 𝑆 ≤ 𝑥 𝑤𝑚, results (i), (ii) and 
(iii) hold. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Replacing 𝑌 =  𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚, we can write the Lagrangian of the 
UMP as 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚)  + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥𝑓)   + 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥) 
Note that in this case it does not necessarily hold that 𝑙 > 0. We therefore rewrite the 

























 + 𝜆𝑥 ≤ 0; 𝑥𝑓 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑓 (−
1 − 𝛼
𝐿






𝑤𝑚 + 𝜆𝑥 ≤ 0; 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑚 (−
𝛼
𝑌′
𝑤𝑚 + 𝜆𝑥) = 0 (8) 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜆𝑥
= 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥) = 0 (9) 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜆𝛺
= 𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝛺 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝛺(𝛺 − 𝑙 − 𝑥𝑓) = 0 (10) 
 
If 𝑥𝑓 > 0, FOC (7) implies 
1−𝛼
𝐿
= 𝜆𝑥. Inserting this into FOC (6) gives 
𝛼
𝑌′
𝑤𝑙 − 𝜆𝑥 ≤ 0. 
However, this expression can only hold simultaneously with FOC (8) if 𝑤𝑙 ≤ 𝑤𝑚. 
If 𝑥𝑚 > 0, FOC (8) implies 
𝛼
𝑌′
𝑤𝑚 = 𝜆𝑥. We first consider the case in which 𝑙 > 0 and FOC 





. Then, FOC (7) can only hold for  𝑤𝑙 ≥ 𝑤𝑚. 
Instead, if 𝑙 = 0, since 𝑌′ must be positive, it must be that 𝑆 > 𝑤𝑚𝑥𝑚. Because we 
imposed 𝑆 < 𝑥𝑤𝑚, then 𝑥𝑚 < 𝑥 and 𝑥𝑓 must be positive. FOC’s (7) and (8) must therefore 
be equalities, and FOC (6) can then only hold if 𝑤𝑙 ≤ 𝑤𝑚. Last, if 𝑥𝑚 > 0 and 𝑙 = 0, the 
following condition must hold 
𝑥𝑚 <
(1 − 𝛼)𝑆 − 𝛼(𝛺 − 𝑥)𝑤𝑙
𝛼𝑤𝑙 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑤𝑚
 
And so, if 𝑆 is small enough or 𝑥 is large enough (in the sense that the numerator of the 
expression on the right-hand-side is negative), then 𝑥𝑚 > 0 cannot hold. 
Finally, this implies that (i) if 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚, then 𝑥𝑓 = 0 and 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥; (ii) if 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚, it may be 
the case that 𝑙 > 0 and 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥 and 𝑥𝑚 = 0, or 𝑙 = 0, 𝑥𝑓 > 0 and 𝑆/𝑤𝑚 > 𝑥𝑚 > 0 with 𝑥𝑓 +
𝑥𝑚 = 𝑥; (iii) if 𝑤𝑙 = 𝑤𝑚, it may be the case that 𝑙 > 0 and 𝑥𝑓 ≥ 0 and 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0, or 𝑥𝑓 = 𝑥, 
𝑥𝑚 = 0 and 𝑙 = 0. Hence, if the in cash subsidy is small in the sense that the family does 
not forgo work altogether, the rules defined by Lemma 1 hold. 
Lemma 4. For families with 𝑤𝑙 > 𝑤𝑚 an in-kind subsidy 𝑠 and an in-cash subsidy 𝑆 =
𝑠 𝑤𝑚 are equivalent in terms of welfare. 
Proof of Lemma 4. We start with the UMP when there is an in-cash subsidy. Replacing 
𝑆 = 𝑠 𝑤𝑚 we have 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − (𝑥𝑚 − 𝑠) 𝑤𝑚)  + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿  + 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥) 





𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − 𝑥𝑚
′  𝑤𝑚) + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿  + 𝜆𝑥 (𝑥𝑚
′ + 𝑥𝑓 − (𝑥 − 𝑠)) 
If we impose the restriction 𝑥𝑚′ ≥ 0, this problem equals the UMP with an in-kind subsidy. 
Let 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗  be the solution to the UMP with an in-kind subsidy and 𝑈𝑖𝑐∗  be the solution to the 
UMP with an in-cash subsidy. Since adding a restriction to the UMP with an in-cash 
subsidy delivers the UMP with an in-kind subsidy, it must be true that 𝑈𝑖𝑐∗ ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗ . 
Now, we start with the UMP with an in-kind subsidy. If we define 𝑥𝑚′′  𝑤𝑚 = 𝑥𝑚  𝑤𝑚 + 𝑆  as 
the total cost of care for a family. Since 𝑆 = 𝑠 𝑤𝑚, 𝑥𝑚′′  = 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑠. Replacing these into the 
UMP with an in-kind subsidy we get 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − 𝑥𝑚
′′  𝑤𝑚) + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿  + 𝜆𝑥 (𝑥𝑚
′′ − 𝑠 + 𝑥𝑓 − (𝑥 − 𝑠)) 
Simplifying the restriction, we have 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − 𝑥𝑚
′′  𝑤𝑚) + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿  + 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚
′′ + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥) 
If we add the restriction 𝑥𝑚′′ ≥ 0, we have the UMP with an in-cash subsidy. Since we 
have written the UMP with an in-cash subsidy as the UMP with an in-kind subsidy and a 
restriction, it must be that 𝑈𝑖𝑐∗ ≤ 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗ . 
Given that 𝑈𝑖𝑐∗ ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗  and 𝑈𝑖𝑐∗ ≤ 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗ , it must be that 𝑈𝑖𝑐∗ = 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗ .  
Lemma 5. For families with 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚, an in-cash subsidy 𝑆 is preferable to an in-kind 
subsidy 𝑠 = 𝑆
𝑤𝑚
. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Let 𝑙′, 𝑥𝑓′ , 𝑥𝑚′  be the solution to the UMP with an in-kind subsidy. 
Because of Lemma 3, 𝑥𝑚′ = 0 and 𝑥𝑓′ = 𝑥 − 𝑠. We define 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗  as the utility level attained 
by this combination. 
Now, we look at the UMP with an in-cash subsidy, and assume we added the restriction 
𝑥𝑚 ≥ 𝑠 . Then, the Lagrangian to the problem would be 
𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆 − 𝑥𝑚
′′  𝑤𝑚)  + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿  + 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚
′′ + 𝑥𝑓
′′ − 𝑥) + 𝜆𝑥𝑚( 𝑥𝑚
′′ − 𝑠) 





















 + 𝜆𝑥 ≤ 0; 𝑥𝑓 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑓 (−
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𝑤𝑚 + 𝜆𝑥 + 𝜆𝑥𝑚 ≤ 0; 𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑚 (−
𝛼
𝑌′







= 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥(𝑥𝑚
′′ + 𝑥𝑓




′′ − 𝑠 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥𝑚 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝑥𝑚( 𝑥𝑚
′′ − 𝑠) = 0 (15) 
 
Notice that this problem generates the same solution as before, 𝑙′′ = 𝑙′, 𝑥𝑚′′ = 𝑠, 𝑥𝑓′′ = 𝑥𝑓′ , 
delivering the same utility level 𝑈𝑖𝑐′′ = 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗ .  
Now, because  𝑥𝑚′′ > 𝑠 > 0, FOC (13) is a strict equality. As we explained earlier, the 






this into FOC (12), we get − 𝛼
𝑌
𝑤𝑙  + 𝜆𝑥 ≤ 0. Because 𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚, then −
𝛼
𝑌
𝑤𝑚  + 𝜆𝑥 < 0. 
Because FOC (13) is an equality, this implies 𝜆𝑥𝑚 > 0. Finally,  𝜆𝑥𝑚 is the shadow cost 
of restriction  𝑥𝑚′′ − 𝑠 ≥ 0, and given that it is positive, it implies that utility is greater if the 
restriction is lifted. Hence, because the maximal utility with an in-kind subsidy can be 
generated in the UMP with and in-cash subsidy by adding a constraint, and because this 
constraint is binding, the UMP with an in-cash subsidy must generate a greater utility 
level.  
Lemma 6. Let 𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆) be the indirect utility function with an in-cash subsidy 𝑆 and 𝑈𝑖𝑘(𝑠) 
be the indirect utility function with an in-kind subsidy 𝑠 = 𝑆/𝑤𝑚. For families with 𝑤𝑙 <
𝑤𝑚, there exists a unique 𝑆∗ < 𝑆 such that   𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆∗) = 𝑈𝑖𝑘(𝑠). 
Proof of Lemma 6. We start by showing that 𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆) is an increasing function of 𝑆. Note 
that  
𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆) = 𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 (𝑙
′ 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆)  + (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝐿
′  
Where 𝑙′, 𝑥𝑓′ , and 𝐿′ = 𝛺 − 𝑙′ − 𝑥𝑓′  are the solutions to the UMP. Our previous discussion 
implied that for  𝑤𝑙 < 𝑤𝑚, 𝑥𝑓′ = 𝑥 and 𝑙′ satisfied the first column of FOC (1) with equality. 



























= 0. Additionally, because of FOC (1), the first and third 





𝑙′ 𝑤𝑙 + 𝑆
 𝑑𝑆 > 0 
Now, note that 𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆) > 𝑈𝑖𝑘(𝑠) > 𝑈𝑖𝑐(0). Note that out indirect utility function is 
continuous. Hence, there must exist some value 𝑆∗ Є (0, 𝑆) such that 𝑈𝑖𝑐(𝑆∗) = 𝑈𝑖𝑘(𝑠). 
Additionally, since 𝑈𝑖𝑐(. ) is strictly increasing, 𝑆∗ is unique. 
